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                                                1	Paper	prepared	for	the	“International	Conference	in	Memory	of	Jean-François	Mertens:	Games	and	Collective	Decisions”	held	 in	Jerusalem	in	June	2013.	I	am	grateful	to	Peter	Wakker	for	helpful	comments	on	a	first	draft;	and	exceptionally	grateful	to	Edi	Karni	for	constructive	exchanges	without	which	this	paper	could	not	have	been	written.	
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1.1 This paper offers a modest contribution to the theme of identifying separately 
probabilities and utility scales in the expected-utility analysis of individual decisions 
under uncertainty with state-dependent preferences. For a background discussion, see 
the survey in Drèze and Rustichini (2004). The basic issue is that probabilities and 
state-dependent utility scales enter as products in expected utility calculations – hence 
are not separately identified from observed decisions. Yet, there are situations where 
separate identification is highly desirable. For instance, it is often claimed that 
medical decisions should reflect the probabilities of the doctor and the utility of the 
patient. 
In order to achieve separate identification, one can (sometimes) rely on expected 
utilities evaluated under alternative probabilities. How do alternative probabilities 
enter the model? There are two routes: (i) actions of the decision-maker affecting the 
likelihood of events (e.g. diet); and (ii) new information modifying the probabilities 
of given events (e.g. medical tests).  
Route (i) carries the limitation of being applicable only to those events that are 
potentially subject to influence by the decision maker2.  It calls for a specification of 
the actions through which that influence is exercised, and their properties, such as: 
are these actions observable?; are they costly?; do they affect preferences, and if so 
how? 
Route (ii) has potentially wider application; but its implementation requires 
evaluation of the probabilities with which specific information may become 
available. This may impose on the decision maker the unwieldy task of assessing the 
probabilities of occurrences that lie outside the decision problem at hand. The present 
paper avoids that difficulty by restricting attention to information with exogenous 
probabilities – coming from statistical sources, expert evaluations and the like. That 
does not exhaust the topic, but has the advantage of transparency.  
Route (i) was followed for the first time (in so far as I know) in Drèze (1958) – my 
unpublished PhD dissertation, written under the precious guidance of William 
Vickrey. The complete model came out in Drèze (1987), with a preview in french 
(Drèze 1961). In that model, actions are not observable, only their influence on state 
probabilities comes in. Observable actions appear in Karni (2011, 2013). 
 Route (ii) was introduced, and integrated with route (i), in Karni (2011), extending 
some of his earlier work3; it is pursued in Karni (2013) – the most general treatment 
to date. 
These papers by Drèze and Karni are technically demanding – the more so when the 
model and assumptions are more general. One motivation of the present paper is to 
provide a transparent analysis for a model that is less general – while retaining 
applicability to a meaningful set of circumstances. Two limitations are introduced: 
(i) actions are assumed observable; they may carry some cost or disutility; but they 
                                                2	Indeed,	influence	by	others	comes	naturally	under	the	heading	of	new	information.	3	For	some	main	references,	see	Drèze	and	Rustichini	(2004).	
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do not affect conditional preferences; this corresponds to the specification in Karni 
(2011), generalised to action-dependent preferences in Karni (2013); it carries the 
limitation that separate identification of probabilities and utility scales is obtained for 
the set of representations with action-independent conditional utility functions;4 
(ii) information carries exogenous probabilities; again, this is generalised in Karni 
(2011, 2013). 
On the other hand, I do not rely on constant utility bets as defined in Karni (2011) or 
strings of such bets as defined in Karni (2013). I rely instead on the less restrictive 
notion of pairs of bets with constant utility differences5. This extension is important 
in many real situations – like life insurance, risky jobs, a.s.o., where the ranges of 
conditional utilities are unlikely to overlap. 
Restrictive assumptions may sometimes be interpreted as characteristics of the class 
of decision problems under study (as with exogenous probabilities for information), 
sometimes as characteristics of preferences (as for constant utility bets), and 
sometimes either way (as for action-independent conditional preferences). 
Restricting attention to a class of decision problems entails no restriction on 
preferences. It is standard practice in decision theory where the models often cover 
decision problems that are not encountered in daily life (like betting on arbitrary 
events). But one should remain conscious of the potential for alternative 
representations. 
 
The present paper illustrates how route (i) and route (ii) combine, in a simple additive 
manner, to generate the desired variation in probabilities – in a formal model that is 
developed as a natural extension of the standard model with state-independent 
preferences, namely the model of Savage (1954) then Anscombe and Aumann (1963). 
In particular, I rely exclusively on naturally observable choices.  
The logic of the argument is straightforward. First, I extend the Savage-Anscombe-
Aumann model to allow for state-dependent preferences, successively with a single 
action (Theorem I), then with multiple actions (Corollary 1). Next, I introduce the 
new concept of “strong separability”, which characterises situations where 
preferences over state-dependent utility gains are revealed invariant to the choice of 
action. That property opens the way towards separate identification of probabilities 
and state-dependent utility scales (Theorem II). Next, I introduce observations and 
define “observational separability”, a parallel (Corollary 2) or complementary 
(Theorem III) avenue towards separate identification. The respective contributions of 
routes (i) and (ii) are found to be of the same nature; they are measured by the rank 
of the matrix of state probabilities with which they are compatible – first separately, 
then jointly. This is a useful explicitation – with the additional merit of being 
technically transparent. 
                                                4	 A	 comparable	 limtation	 is	 also	 present	 in	 the	 model	 of	 Savage	 (1954)	 where	 the	probabilities	 and	 utilities	 are	 identified	 in	 the	 set	 of	 representations	 with	 state-independent	utility	functions.	See	further	comments	in	section	4	below.	5	Such	pairs	are	mentioned	in	footnote	12	of	Karni	(2011).	
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1.2 A simple example may help intuition. A sailor plans to cross from Bermuda to 
the Azores, on his way back to work in Portugal. Listening to weather forecasts, he 
hears that a major storm is building up on the Atlantic. If the storms heads north, it 
will cross the sailor’s route, with possibly severe implications, ranging from minor 
boat damages to dismasting. But perhaps the storm will head west and stay off the 
planned route. The ensuing developments (“states”) may be summarised as: (θ) no 
storm, safe crossing; (θ’) storm, minor damages; (θ”) storm, dismasting. With these 
three states, the sailor could associate subjective probabilities, as well as state-
dependent utilities. To that end, he consults a decision theorist, who: (i) elicits his 
preferences over a set (B) of bets (b), with state-dependent monetary payoffs (z); but 
(ii) concludes that he cannot, on that basis, identify separately the sailor’s 
probabilities and state-dependent utility scales. 
Besides immediate departure (a), the sailor has access to an alternative action, (a’): 
take on board a volunteer crew, whose assistance would reduce the risk of 
dismasting6, thereby modifying the relative probabilities of alternatives (θ’,θ”). The 
sailor could also adopt the strategy (f) of postponing his choice between (a) and (a’) 
until hearing tomorrow’s weather forecast. That strategy involves new information, 
hence a new probability for (θ). Processing the implications of alternative actions or 
new information for the separate identification of probabilities and state-dependent 
utility scales is the subject matter of this paper. In my example, the decision theorist 
could achieve separate identification by combining the choice of action with the new 
information (as explained below). 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces basic concepts and notation. 
Analytical developments are then divided in two Parts: Part I considers actions with 
no observations, Part II combines actions and observations. Each Part consists of an 
introduction and two sections: (i) a single action (sections 3 and 5); and (ii) multiple 
actions (sections 4 and 6). Section 7 consists of two brief concluding comments. 
 
2. Basic concepts and notation 
 
Starting from the Savage-Anscombe-Aumann framework, let: 
 Θ be a finite set of T states (θ, θ’, ...)7; 
Z be a set of outcomes (z, z’, ...) defined as probability distributions on a finite 
set of primary outcomes (money in the above example). 
 
A bet b ∈ B is a mapping b : Θ → Z that assigns an outcome to every state.	
 
                                                6	Two	men	on	board	take	turns	supervising	the	course,	whereas	lone	sailors	must	sleep	part	of	the	time...	7	“States”	are	labeled	“effects”	in	Karni	(2011,	2013).	
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In addition, let A be a finite set of M actions (a, a’, ...); and 
                let a consequence c ∈ C : = Z x A x Θ be a triplet (z, a, θ), 
equivalently denoted (b, a, θ).	
 
A decision d ∈ D is a pair (a, b) ∈ (A x B), or more generally a lottery l ∈ L := Δ(D)8  
over such pairs. A lottery involving a single action reduces to a bet.9 10 
 
 Starting from a bet b, to replace b(θ) by b’(θ) for some θ, I write bb’(θ). 
Preferences (≿,≽,≈) are defined over lotteries. They satisfy throughout the von 
Neumann /Morgenstern axioms:	 
 
(A.1) Weak Order: ≽ on L is complete and transitive. 
 
(A.2) Independence: for all d, d’, d” in D and all α ∈ (0, 1], d ≽ d’ if and only if 
αd + (1 - α)d” ≽ αd’ + (1 - α)d”. 
 
(A.3) Continuity: for all d, d’, d” in D, if d ≻ d’ ≻ d”, then there exist  
(α ,β) ∈ (0, 1)2 such that αd + (1 - α)d” ≻ d’ ≻ βd + (1 - β)d”. 
 
I also assume throughout: 
 
(A.4) Non-triviality: for each a in A, there exist b, b’ in B such that (a, b) ≻ (a, b’). 
 
 
Part I: Actions (no observations) 
 
This part complements the earlier work of Drèze (1961, 1987): (i) by treating actions 
as observable, instead of implicit, choices; and (ii) by letting actions affect 
preferences directly in addition to via their impact on the likelihood of events. Still, 




                                                8	Δ(D)	is	the	set	of	probability	distributions	over	D.	9	Indeed,	“outcomes”	are	themselves	probability	distributions.	10	In	my	example,	there	are	3	states	and	2	actions.	The	decision	theorist	defines	bets	(b)	with	random	monetary	payoffs	conditional	on	states	(θ,	θ’..);	he	then	observes	the	sailor’s	preferences	among	such	bets	under	action	(a),	that	is,	preferences	among	decisions	(a,b),	(a,b’),...	a.s.o..	
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3. Single action: A = (a) 
 
This section is an extension of Anscombe-Aumann (1963 – hereafter AA) to state-
dependent preferences. Beyond (A.1)-(A.4), AA use two assumptions : « conditional 
preferences » (their “monotonicity”) and « reversal of order ». I relax their conditional 
preferences to allow for state-dependence. 
 
Definition 1 (state-dependent conditional preferences):  
 
b ≽ b’ given a and θ (b ≽a,θb’) iff, for some b* ∈ B, (a, b*b(θ))≽ (a, b*b’(θ)). 
 
(A.5) Conditional preferences: for all (a, θ, b, b’), if b ≽a,θ b’, then there does not exist 
b*’ such that (a, b*’b(θ))≺a,θ (a, b*’b’(θ)). 
 
Under assumptions (A.1)-(A.5), the conditional preferences over bets can be 
represented by expected utilities of their outcomes. 
 
Definition 2 (reversal of order): With a single given action, a lottery over decisions 
is a lottery over bets, hence is itself a bet. If it is a matter of indifference to the 
decision-maker that the random drawing takes place before or after the state is 
revealed, reversal of order holds.  
With a single action, early information about the outcome of the bet is modeled as 
worthless, in this abstract model: no decision depends on that outcome11. Hence the 
assumption that the drawing of the lottery choosing a bet may indifferently be drawn 
before or after observing the state: 
 
(A.6) Reversal of order: every lottery l in L assigning probability 1 to action a and 
probabilities µ(b/l) to elements of B is indifferent to the decision ( a, (µ(b/l))). 
 
Not surprisingly, probabilities and units of scale of conditional utilities are not 
separately identified, in this model; only their products are identified. I record this 
property by stating that probabilities and utilities are “jointly, but not separately, 
identified.” 
 
Theorem I. (AA, as per Theorem 4.9 in Drèze-Rustichini (2004)). 
Let A = (a). Under (A.1)-(A.6), there exists a family of probability measures π(θ/a) 
and a family of utility functions u(b, a, θ) such that  
 
            (a, b) ≽ (a, b’) iff  Σθ π(θ/a).[u(b, a, θ) – u(b’, a, θ)] ≥ 0; (1) 
                                                11	There	are	of	course	many	real	life	situations	where	this	property	does	not	hold,	because	time	elapses	before	the	state	obtains,	and	the	decision	maker	may	be	adverse	to	“living	under	uncertainty”	–a	theme	repeatedly	explored	by	Robin	Pope	since	(1983).	
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the probabilities and utilities are jointly, but not separately, identified.	 
 
Thus, the model of this section places no restriction on admissible probabilities – as 
initially concluded by the decision theorist in my example... 
 
4. Multiple actions 
 
With multiple actions, the developments under 3 can be repeated for each a ε A. But  
assumption (A.5) for conditional preferences must be extended to actions.  
 
(A.7) Extended conditional preferences: for all a in A and θ in Θ, if  
(a, b*b(θ)) ≽ (a, b*b’(θ)), then there do not exist (a’, b*’) in (A x B) such that  
(a’, b*’b(θ))≺ (a’, b*’b’(θ)). 
      
That is, u(b, a, θ) and u(b, a’, θ) are positive linear transformations of each other, 
conditionally on θ. Since the units of scale of these utilities are undefined under 
Theorem I, they may be chosen identical - with natural implications for probabilities 
- yielding an action-independent representation of conditional preferences. One then 
says that the functions {u(b, a, θ)}a∈A are related by a cardinal unit-comparable 
transformation (are “jointly cardinal”); and one obtains the following result: 
 
Corollary 1: Under (A.1)-(A.4) and (A.7), there exist a family of probability measures 
π(θ/a), a family of utility functions u(b, θ) and a function v(a) such that 
 
       (a, b) ≽ (a’, b’) iff  Σθπ(θ/a)u(b, θ) + v(a) ≥ Σθπ(θ/a’)u(b’, θ) + v(a’), (2)  
 
where: 
- the probabilities and utilities are jointly, but not separately, identified;  
- the functions {u(b, θ)}θ in Θ and v(a) are jointly cardinal.  
 
Remark: In the representation (2), the action (a) does not appear as an argument of 
u(b, θ) in view of (A.7); but (2) does not rule out that v(a) = Σθ v(a/θ), reflecting  
indeterminacy of the origins of the conditional utility functions12. 
 
Multiple actions imply restrictions on relative units of scale of the state-dependent 
utilities. In Drèze (1987), the analysis of these restrictions rests on the concept of 
                                                12	 In	 the	 example,	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 volunteer	 crew	may	 affect	 the	 pleasure	 of	 the	crossing,	hence	the	origins	of	the	conditional	utilities;	but	it	may	not	affect	the	conditional	betting	preferences.	
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equipotence,13 geared to (unobservable) actions for which v(a) = 0. In the model of 
this paper, I introduce instead the following central concept: 
 
Definition 3 (strong separability): 
Define B2 ⊂ B × B as the set of pairs of bets ( b, b’) such that, for all a, a’ in A, the 
lottery l assigning equal probabilities to the decisions (a, b) and (a’, b’) is indifferent 
to the otherwise identical lottery l’ assigning equal probabilities to  (a’, b) and 
(a, b’). 
 
      Heads  Tails 
 
   l (a, b)   (a’, b’) 
 
    l’  (a’, b)  (a, b’) 
 
 
In view of Corollary 1, the bets ( b, b’) in B2 are such that the expected utility gain 
 
Σθπ(θ/a).[u( b, θ) – u( b’,θ)] is independent of a.14 15        (3) 
 
If the set of actions A is so rich that there exist T linearly independent probability 
vectors π(θ/a)16, then conditions (3) imply that the utility differences [u( b, θ) – 
u( b’,θ)] are independent of θ - so that relative units of scale of state-dependent 
utilities are uniquely identified. Indeed, denoting by Π the TxT matrix of these 
probability vectors, and by ι the Tx1 vector of 1’s, we have: Π.ι = ι =Π-1.ι, so that  
 
  Π.[u(b, θ) – u(b’,θ)] = k.ι implies [u(b, θ) – u(b’,θ)] = kι. 
 
Definition 4 (strictness): 
A pair of bets ( b,  b’) in B2 is unique up to replacement of its coordinates by 
equivalent outcomes if there does not exist another pair ( b*,  b’) in B2 with the 
property that b*(θ) is indifferent to b(θ) for some but not all θ’s. 
                                                13	Two	games	are	“equipotent”	if	lotteries	among	them	verify	reversal	of	order;	see	section	6	in	Drèze	and	Rustichini	(2004).	14	 The	 equal	 probabilities	 in	 Definition	 3	 are	 crucial:	 they	 entail	 irrelevance	 of	 states	whose	probabilities	are	identical	under	a	and	a’.	The	condition	that	l	and	l’	be	“otherwise	identical”	allows	for	equal	probabilities	lower	than	½.	15	The	property	(3)	holds	for	equipotent	bets	in	Drèze	(1987),	where	in	addition	v(a)	=	0.	The	step	from	equipotence	to	strong	separability	aims	precisely	at	allowing	for	v(a)	>	0.	16	In	other	words,	if	the	set	of	actions	allows	the	decision-maker	to	affect	the	probability	of	every	single	state.	
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The set B2 is said to be strict if each of its constituent pairs is unique up to 
replacement of its coordinates by equivalent outcomes. 
 
If B2 is strict, it consists of pairs of bets with constant utility differences.17 
 
Theorem II. 
If B2 is strict, the probabilities and units of scale of utilities in Theorem I are 
separately identified in the set of representations with action-independent 
conditional utility functions. 
 
Proof of Theorem II: any state-dependent rescaling of the conditional utilities  
u(b, θ) would lead to violate the conditions [u( b, θ) – u( b’,θ)] = kι.          QED 
 
In my example, no action affects the probability of θ (no storm) relative to the 
probability of θ’∪θ” (storm); but a’ (hosting a crew) entails relative probabilities 
for θ’ (no dismasting) versus θ” (dismasting) that are different from those entailed 
by a (sailing alone). Condition (3) then boils down to: 
  
  u( b, θ’) – u( b’, θ’) = u( b, θ”) – u( b’, θ”).         (3bis) 
 
That is, the utility difference between b and b’ in B2 is the same under θ’ as under 
θ’’, thereby identifying the relative units of scale of the associated conditional 
utilities. 
The concept of strong separability is thus meaningful, and elements of B2 are 
readily identified. But with 3 states and 2 actions, strictness is excluded.  
 
 
Part II: Actions and observations 
 
Let E be a set of N mutually exclusive but collectively exhaustive observations Ei  of 
given probabilities π(Ei) > 0. Treating π(Ei) as a primitive is restrictive (see C.2 in 
section 7), but natural in the case of statistical observations or official (e.g. weather) 
forecasts. 
In my example, an observation corresponds to the report tomorrow about the path of 
the storm (west or north); that path is not influenced by the sailor’s actions; and the 
probabilities about tomorrow’s path come from the weather office – hence are given 
to the sailor. 
 
                                                17	This	is	a	weaker	property	than	“constant	utilities”,	as	discussed	in	Drèze	(1987)	and	assumed	 in	 Karni	 (2011,	 2013)	 –	 a	 condition	 that	 requires	 overlapping	 ranges	 for	conditional	utilities.	
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E x Θ defines an event tree with elements (Ei, θ) and 3 dates (0, E, Θ) := (0, 1, 2).18 
 
A strategy is a function f ∈ F: E → D = A x B that assigns a decision to each 
observation19. I extend assumptions (A.1)-(A.4) and (A.7) from decisions or lotteries 
to strategies. 
 
In Theorem I and Corollary 1, one may then replace π(θ/a) by Σi π(Ei).π(θ/Ei, a). 
 
With π(Ei) given, it is possible to construct, through randomisation, a set E* of 
equiprobable observations Ei*. Thus, letting EN denote an observation such that π(Ei) 
≥ π(EN) for all i, define Ei* as the product of Ei with a random drawing of probability 
π(EN)/π(Ei); then π(Ei*) := π(EN) > 0 for all i20.  
A counterpart of strong separability is readily defined for E*. I do so in two steps: 
first under a given action a, then across actions. Indeed, the first step is of independent 
interest. 
 
5. Single action 
 
As noted in Definition 2, with a single action, strategies reduce to bets. 
Write , b’b(E*i) for the bet b’ modified conditionally on E*i so as to coincide there 
with b. 
 
Definition 5 (observational separability): 
Let B2a be the set of pairs of bets (b, b’) such that (a, b’b(E*i)) ~ (a, b’b(E*j)) for all i,j. 
 
The pairs of bets in B2a are readily seen to satisfy 
 
             Σθπ(θ/Ei*, a).[u(a, b’, θ) – u(a, b, θ)] is independent of i. (4) 
 
Applying to B2a the definition of strictness introduced above for B2, we obtain21: 
 
Corollary 2. 
If B2a is strict, the probabilities and the units of scale of state-dependent utilities in 
Theorem I are separately identified. 
 
                                                18	In	my	example,	date	0	is	today;	date	1	is	tomorrow,	when	a	new	weather	report	is	issued;	and	date	2	is	whenever	the	storm	does	(or	would)	cross	the	sailor’s	route.	There	are	2	events	at	date	1	(“west”	or	“north”);	the	3	final	states	at	date	2	are	unchanged.	19	This	concept	of	strategy	is	used	in	Karni	(2011).	20	The	sum	over	i	of	π(Ei*) is thus less than 1 – but that is immaterial, as already noted in 
footnote 14 above, for pairs of strategies that are “otherwise identical”.	21	Note	that	strictness	of B2a	requires	N	≥	T;	see	C.1	in	section	7.	
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Corollary 3. 
If B2a is strict, the origins of the state-dependent utilities in Theorem I are uniquely 
defined, up to a common additive constant. 
 
In my example, assume for transparency that π(θ) = π(E1) = ½ with π(θ/E1) = 1. Then, 
condition (4) imposes that the gain in utility from replacing b’(θ) by b(θ) be the same 
as the gain in expected utility from replacing b’ by b on θ’∪θ”, under action a. The 
concept of observational separability is thus meaningful, and elements of B2a are 
readily identified. But with 3 states and 2 observations strictness is excluded. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: If B2a is strict, the N x T matrix with elements π(θ/a, Ei*) 
owns a TxT (sub)matrix Πa of full rank T. Accordingly,  
Πa.[u(b, a, θ) – u(b’, a, θ)] = kι for some k > 0 and [u(b, a, θ) – u(b’, a, θ)] = kι. 
The relative units of scale of utilities are thus identified uniquely, entailing the same 
property for the probabilities.                        QED 
 
Proof of Corollary 3: Write u(b, a, θ) in Theorem I as cw(b, a, θ) + ya(θ). Then: 
Σθ[π(θ/a, Ei*) - π(θ/a, Ej*)]ya(θ) is independent of i and j. If Πa has full rank, this 
places T-1 constraints on da.                QED 
 
6. Multiple actions  
 
Definition 6 (global separability): 
Let B2* be the set of pairs of bets (b*, b*’) ε ∩a in A B2a that satisfy strong 
separability conditionally on Ei* for all Ei* in E*. 
 
It is readily verified that every pair of bets in B2* satisfies 
 
           Σθπ(θ/Ei*, a).[u(b’, θ) – u(b, θ)] is independent of i and a. (5) 
  
Theorem III. 
If B2* is strict, the probabilities and units of scale in Theorem II are separately 
identified in the set of representations with action-independent conditional utility 
functions. 
 
The proof of Theorem III is parallel to that of Corollary 2. 
 
In my example, strategies call for deciding whether or not to host a crew after 
hearing tomorrow’s weather report. Preferences over strategies permit relating the 
units of scale of utility conditional on “no storm” to the units of scale of expected 
utility conditional on “storm” – equation (4). And preferences over actions permit 
relating the units of scale of utility conditional on “no dismasting” to those 
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conditional on “dismasting” – equation (3bis). Accordingly, B2* is strict, and 
Corollary 4 applies. The complementarity between actions and observations 
towards separate identification of probabilities and utility scales stands out neatly. 
 
Remark: If B2* is not strict, but admits k < T - 1 degrees of freedom22, then the 
probabilities and units of scale of state-dependent utilities are only partly identified, 




7. Concluding comments  
   
C1. That B2* be strict is indeed a “strict” condition, unlikely to be verified in many 
(most!) situations. My purpose is to elucidate the requirements underlying separate 
identification, not to assume them. 
 
Yet, strictness of B2* is much less demanding than strictness of B2, or of B2a for 
some a. It will often be the case that observations impact probabilities in different 
domains than actions do – as my example clearly illustrates.23 And there may exist 
specific interactions between observations and actions, reflected in the probabilities 
π(θ/a, Ei). With N potential observations and M actions, there is scope for NM 
conditional probability vectors, of which one could hope that T be linearly 
independent. Starting from the number of linearly independent probability vectors 
associated with actions in absence of observations, one may quantify the respective 
contributions of actions and observations to separate identification of probabilities 
and utility scales under action-independent utilities. 
 
C2. This paper rests on observations with given (exogenous) probabilities. 
That feature is used only in constructing the “equiprobable observations” underlying 
conditions (4) and (5). It seems natural to conjecture that the analysis here could be 
extended to a model where equiprobable observations are based on subjective 
probabilities of primitive observations – as in Karni (2011, 2013). But elicitation of 
these subjective probabilities is not immediate, because the observations affect the 
(action-dependent) subjective probabilities of the states. 
Similarly, one would like to relax assumption (A.7) and allow for action-dependent 
conditional preferences. But the implication (3) of strong separability would then be 
lost. I have not found a reformulation of strong separability retaining implication (3). 
                                                22	That	is,	the	condition	in	Definition	4	that	a	bet	be	“unique	up	to	replacement	of	its	coordinates	by	equivalent	outcomes”	does	not	hold	for	k	out	of	T	coordinates.	23	In	the	example,	strictness	of B2*	results	from	the	combination	of	2	constraints	on	probabilities	–	one	coming	from	(3bis)	(multiple	actions),	the	other	from	(4)	(observation).	
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Whether that could be achieved without relying on constant-utility bets is an 
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